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OVERRULING CRAWFORD  V.  WASHINGTON :
WHY AND  HOW
David Crump*
The stars are aligned today for the overruling of Crawford v. Wash-
ington.1  Although Justice Scalia’s opinion in that Confrontation
Clause case omitted analysis of most of the recognized factors justify-
ing its sharp departure from stare decisis,2 by now those factors have
developed in a way that justifies departure from Crawford itself.3  For
example, even commentators who support the apparent goal of that
decision, namely, broad exclusion of evidence on Confrontation
Clause grounds, describe Crawford and its progeny as unstable.4  The
underpinnings of the decision are dubious and, in some instances,
provably wrong.5 Crawford has led to a series of decisions by closely
 2012 David Crump.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* A.B., Harvard College; J.D., University of Texas School of Law. John B. Neibel
Professor of Law, University of Houston.
1 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2 See infra Part II of this Article (discussing criteria developed by Supreme Court
for departure from stare decisis).
3 See infra Conclusion (discussing the fit between overruling Crawford and the
criteria for departure from stare decisis).
4 E.g., Michael D. Cicchini, Dead Again: The Latest Demise of the Confrontation
Clause, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1310 (2011) (arguing that progeny of Crawford
“incorporate[ ] every single . . . flaw[ ]” that preexisted); The Supreme Court 2010 Term:
Leading Cases: I. Constitutional Law: D. Sixth Amendment: Confrontation Clause, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 251, 258–260 (2011) (characterizing one of Crawford’s progeny as reaching
“correct outcome” by excluding evidence but as showing a “lack of agreement” and as
making doctrine “unclear”); Jason Widdison, Michigan v. Bryant: The Ghost of Roberts
and the Return of Reliability, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 219, 240 (2011) (characterizing results as
“unstable”).  Many other Articles also criticize the confusion that has followed Craw-
ford. See, e.g., authorities cited infra in footnotes 18, 19, 108, and 164–75.
5 See infra Part III.A (showing that Justice Scalia’s historical analysis is wrong in
its assertion that dying declarations were the only exception to the exclusion of testi-
monial hearsay).
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divided Courts6 that have left important issues heavily discussed but
unresolved.7  To reach decisions that make sense after Crawford, the
Justices have resorted to transparent judicial fudging.8  In summary,
the Crawford approach is neither faithful to the Constitution nor work-
able.  And by now, remarkably, a majority of the Court is united in
rejecting that approach9 and preferring differing alternatives that eas-
ily could be reconciled and that would produce results more congru-
ent with the purposes of the Confrontation Clause.10
The regime that preceded Crawford did not feature the kind of
indeterminacy that has followed that decision.  The principal earlier
decision, Ohio v. Roberts,11 was imperfect, to be sure, but contrary to
statements in Crawford, its rationale was traceable to the history of the
Confrontation Clause.12  Decisions made under its approach did not
require judicial legerdemain to come to reasonable conclusions.13
Furthermore, Crawford ignores the justifications recognized by the
Court for departure from stare decisis, in this instance by its jettisoning
6 Some of the late decisions have featured four-Justice dissents as well as separate
concurrences, meaning that only a minority of Justices agreed to the most important
statements of the prevailing rationales. See infra Part VI.B.
7 See Leading Cases, supra note 4, at 259–260 (citing “lack of agreement” and
“unclear” doctrine).
8 See infra Part IV (describing the judicial fudging).
9 See infra Part IV (describing cases in which Justice Thomas concurred sepa-
rately, with a separate rationale, and in which four Justices dissented);.see also Part VI
(describing Williams v. Illinois, in which the coalition to overrule Crawford formed and
in which the Court arguably has already overruled it).
10 See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
11 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (holding that Confrontation Clause does not bar hear-
say that “bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability’” (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S.
204, 212 (1972))).
12 See infra Part II.B (showing, contrary to the Crawford rationale, that the Roberts
reliability rationale was historically accurate)e.
13 See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814–15, 827 (1990) (excluding evi-
dence, with four dissenters who relied, as did the majority, on Roberts); Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182, 186 (1987) (excluding evidence, with three dissent-
ers who relied, as did the majority, on Roberts); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387,
392, 401 (1986) (admitting evidence, with two dissenters who relied, as did the major-
ity, on Roberts).  Finally, in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992), the United States,
as amicus curiae, argued a theory roughly similar to the theory later accepted in Craw-
ford— that application of the Confrontation Clause should be confined to historical
concerns about testimonial hearsay.  The majority rejected this theory. Id. at 352–53.
Justices Thomas and Scalia accepted its general idea. Id. at 358–59.
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of Roberts,14 and overruling Crawford would replace that decision with
satisfactory doctrine even if the Court failed to update Roberts.15
Articles discussing Crawford are numerous, as might be expected.
They are generally uncomplimentary,16 featuring descriptions ranging
from “unstable”17 to “unspeakable.”18  Few of them, however, discuss
whether Crawford should be overruled,19 and none analyzes this ques-
tion in light of the Court’s doctrine that governs departures from stare
decisis.  That is the ultimate purpose of this Article.  The reason for
this void in the scholarship may be the recent rendition of Supreme
Court decisions that most persuasively demonstrate the need for
rejecting Crawford.20  In other words, although Crawford itself has been
around for some time and has been the subject of several analyses, it is
only recently that this Article can be written in convincing terms, and
its subject is new.
The Article begins with descriptions of Roberts and Crawford, the
two opposing decisions considering the Confrontation Clause.  It then
analyzes the manner in which the Crawford Court overruled Roberts
and compares the Court’s reasoning to criteria it has developed for
departures from stare decisis.  Next, the Article considers defects in the
Crawford decision, with particular attention to errors in its rationale,
later decisions attempting to follow it, issues that have remained
unresolved, and the practical effects that have resulted.  The sixth sec-
tion of the Article discusses Williams v. Illinois, in which a coalition
formed to reject the Crawford rationale—and in which the Court
arguably has overruled that decision by implication.  A final section
sets out the author’s conclusions, which include the propositions that
the overruling of Roberts was not justified by the reasoning in Crawford,
14 See infra Part II.
15 See infra notes 76–77 and accompanying text (containing Justice Scalia’s state-
ment that results under Roberts were “largely consistent” with his own views of the
Confrontation Clause); see also supra text accompanying note 4 (showing the contrast
to criticism of doctrine after Crawford); text accompanying note 13 (showing the con-
sistency of basic doctrine after Roberts).
16 See supra sources and text accompanying note 4.
17 Widdison, supra note 4, at 240.
18 Jennifer E. Rutherford, Unspeakable! Crawford v. Washington and Its Effects on
Child Victims of Sexual Assault, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 137 (2005).
19 One notable exception is John Scott, “Confronting” Foreign Intelligence: Crawford
Roadblocks to Domestic Terrorism Trials, 101 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1039, 1073, 1076
(2011) (stating that Crawford poses “challenges” for trials of accused terrorists and
arguing that it is a “priority . . . to overturn Crawford”).
20 See infra Part IV.B (citing recent decisions and showing instability, judicial
fudging, and dubious results after Crawford).
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but that the overruling of Crawford is amply justified by criteria
expressed in the Court’s stare decisis decisions.
I. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE, OHIO V. ROBERTS, AND
CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that in crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right “to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.”21  The Court has interpreted this
clause as providing various guarantees to the criminal defendant,
including the right of “vigorous cross-examination,”22 the right to
face-to-face presentation of witnesses,23 and the right to severance if a
codefendant’s confession is to be introduced before the jury.24  Proba-
bly the most expansive application of the Confrontation Clause, how-
ever, is its use to exclude some kinds of hearsay.  The hearsay rule and
the Confrontation Clause are said to embody overlapping principles
that spring from similar concerns, although it is well established that
the two are not coterminous.  In other words, some evidence that
would be admitted under the hearsay rule may be excluded by the
Confrontation Clause, and some that would be admitted under the
Confrontation Clause may be excluded by the hearsay rule, but they
have intertwined purposes and jurisprudence.25
Before 2004, the Court interpreted the Confrontation Clause as a
guarantee that hearsay evidence would meet criteria tending to show
reliability.  The leading case was Ohio v. Roberts,26 which excluded
unconfronted hearsay unless it was supported by indicia of reliability.
Roberts also held that evidence admitted under a “firmly rooted” hear-
say exception was considered to exhibit these indicia.27 Roberts was
part of a long chain of reliability-based decisions that excluded evi-
dence from preliminary hearings unless the declarant was unavaila-
ble,28 disapproved newly minted hearsay exceptions that did not
depend upon sufficient indications of reliability,29 and outlawed code-
21 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
22 Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2012).
23 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988).
24 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 131 (1968).
25 See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016 (stating that “most” of the Court’s confrontation cases
have involved either hearsay admissibility or scope of cross examination); see also
United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 393 n.5 (1986) (showing overlap, but showing
that the overlap is not complete).
26 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
27 Id.
28 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965).
29 Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987).
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fendants’ confessions under some conditions,30 among other kinds of
evidence.  On the other hand, the reliable-and-firmly-rooted approach
resulted in the reception of evidence such as excited utterances and
statements during medical examinations: evidence conforming to
established hearsay exceptions.31
Then came Crawford v. Washington, which rejected the long line
of decisions that included Ohio v. Roberts.32  Reliability, which had
been the touchstone of hearsay admissibility, suddenly was irrelevant.
The Confrontation Clause, wrote Justice Scalia for the Court, “is a pro-
cedural rather than a substantive guarantee.”33  It “commands,” he
said, “not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”34
The Confrontation Clause is a guarantee about “witnesses,” and Jus-
tice Scalia therefore needed to define “witnesses.”  He asserted that
witnesses provide “testimony,” which in turn, he inferred, meant state-
ments repeated by witnesses at trial.35  But it meant only some kinds of
statements, namely, those that provide “testimony.”36  An out-of-court
statement that was not testimonial could be repeated by a witness with-
out violating the Confrontation Clause, no matter how unreliable it
might be.37  The Court failed to provide a definition of the key word,
“testimonial,” but it referred to the resulting quantity, “testimony,” as
“typically a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing . . . some fact.”38
In reaching these conclusions, Justice Scalia purported to rely on
textual, historical, and prudential justifications.39  The reasoning in
Crawford supporting these rationales, however, is dubious and in some
particulars simply wrong.40  Furthermore, although the Court has pro-
tected the principle of stare decisis with the requirement that the over-
30 Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 139 (1999).
31 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1992).
32 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60–61 (2004).
33 Id. at 61.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 51–52.
36 Id. at 51.
37 See id. at 68 (allowing states “flexibility” in applying hearsay rules to statements
that are not testimonial).
38 Id. at 51 (internal citation omitted).  The testimony, however, is likely to vio-
late state rules or even the Due Process Clause if it is seriously unreliable.
39 Id. at 42 (considering the text, but stating that it did not “alone” resolve the
case); id. at 43–57 (citing historical sources); see id. at 63 (alluding to the prudential
concern that the Roberts test was “amorphous”).
40 See infra Part III.A–B (pointing out assertions that are demonstrably erroneous
and historically incomplete).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL103.txt unknown Seq: 6  8-NOV-12 12:21
120 notre dame law review [vol. 88:1
ruling of an existing decision meet certain specified criteria, Justice
Scalia failed to analyze any of those criteria.  The next section of this
article will consider this aspect of the Crawford decision.
II. COMPARING CRAWFORD TO THE SUPREME COURT’S REQUIREMENT
FOR DEPARTURE FROM STARE DECISIS
A. Criteria for Overruling Earlier Decisions: Can Crawford’s Departure
from Stare Decisis Be Justified?
In such decisions as Payne v. Tennessee41 and Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,42 the Supreme Court has attempted to protect the principle of
stare decisis while at the same time allowing for the overruling of bad
decisions.  Without this protection, stability of decisions would be dif-
ficult to maintain, and arguably the ultimate result would be destruc-
tion of the judicial function.43  An excessive protection, however,
would enshrine demonstrably erroneous decisions in an impregnable
fortress forever, so that Brown v. Board of Education44 could never over-
turn the separate-but-equal principle of Plessy v. Ferguson.45  The
Court’s criteria for departure from stare decisis are malleable, as are
most judicial doctrines, and they result in different statements by dif-
ferent Justices.  Nevertheless, Justice Scalia’s omission even to con-
sider these criteria in Crawford is an unfortunate aspect of the
decision.
Payne v. Tennessee is one of the cases that sets out the criteria.
There, the Court overruled its earlier decisions in Booth v. Maryland46
and South Carolina v. Gathers.47  Those cases had produced an odd
doctrine: that the result of the crime—the harm done—was irrelevant
to a convicted perpetrator’s sentence.48  Specifically, Booth and Gathers
had held, contrary to reason, history, and policy,49 that the impact of
the crime upon the victim was not a proper consideration in the fash-
ioning of the sentence.  The Court posited that a criminal defendant
41 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
42 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
43 Cf. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (“Stare decisis . . . promotes the evenhanded, predict-
able, and consistent development of legal principles, . . . and contributes to the actual
and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”).
44 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
45 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
46 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
47 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
48 Payne, 501 U.S. at 817–20.
49 Id. at 819–20, 826 (using history in overruling Booth and Gathers, reason by
stating that the history is “understandabl[e],” and policy in concluding that the over-
ruled decisions produced “unfairness”).
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must be treated as a “uniquely individual human bein[g],”50 which by
itself was an unremarkable observation, although its connection to the
result was distant.  The next step in the reasoning, one that exhibited
little in the way of logic, was that the only proper considerations in
sentencing were “the character of the individual and the circum-
stances of the crime.”51  The word “circumstances” might seem to
have suggested that the harm done to the victim was a proper ele-
ment, but again, the Court’s logic was more scattered than that.  To
the extent that victim impact evidence presented “factors about which
the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to the decision to
kill,” said the Court, this evidence had nothing to do with the “blame-
worthiness of a particular defendant.”52
In Payne, which overruled Booth and Gathers, the Court had little
trouble in characterizing this logic as erroneous.  The assessment of
harm caused by the defendant as a result of the crime “has under-
standably been an important concern of the criminal law, both in
determining the elements of the offense and in determining the
appropriate punishment,” wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist for the
Court.  In fact, “two equally blameworthy criminal defendants may be
guilty of different offenses solely because their acts cause differing
amounts of harm.”53  For example, “[i]f a bank robber aims his gun at
a guard, pulls the trigger, and kills his target, he may be put to death.
If the gun unexpectedly misfires, he may not.  His moral guilt in both
cases is identical, but his responsibility in the former is greater.”54
There remained, however, the question whether stare decisis
required following Booth and Gathers, “despite these numerous infir-
mities.”55  The Court therefore proceeded to explain its departure
from stare decisis by reference to five criteria.  First, the rejection of
precedent could be justified “when governing decisions are unwork-
able or are badly reasoned.”56  Second, departure from precedent can
be justified more readily in constitutional cases, because in such cases
“correction through legislative action is practically impossible.”57
Third, the presence or absence of reliance interests was important.
“Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases
involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are
50 Id. at 818 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 819.
54 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55 Id. at 827.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 828 (citations omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted).
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involved . . . . [T]he opposite is true in cases such as the present one
involving procedural and evidentiary rules.”58  Fourth, the narrowness
of deciding votes and the existence of “spirited dissents” contributed
to the case for departure from precedent.59  Fifth and finally, depar-
ture could be justified more easily for decisions that “have been ques-
tioned by Members of the Court in later decisions and have defied
consistent application by the lower courts.”60  Consideration of these
factors led the Court to conclude that Booth and Gathers “were wrongly
decided and should be, and now are, overruled.”61
Planned Parenthood v. Casey applied a roughly similar analysis to
reach the opposite conclusion: that the decision under consideration,
which happened to be Roe v. Wade,62 should be retained rather than
overruled.  First, the Court reasoned that Roe had not “proven
unworkable.”63  Second, the Court evaluated “reliance interest[s],”
concluding that many people had “organized intimate relationships”
in a manner that depended upon a right to abortion.64  Third, no
“evolution of legal principle” had left Roe’s central rule an “anachro-
nism,” as might have happened if other legal rules had produced
results clashing with that decision or its reasoning.65  Fourth, no
change had occurred in Roe’s “factual underpinning” requiring a dif-
ferent decision; there was no technological change, for example, that
undermined the decision.66  Fifth, comparison with other decisions
that had overruled earlier principles did not show an equal need for
overruling Roe.67  And sixth and finally, overruling Roe might appear
to be the result of political considerations, and this perception might
weaken the judicial power.68
But the apparent clarity of these criteria is at variance with reality.
Some of the Planned Parenthood Court’s applications of its criteria to
58 Id. (citations omitted).
59 Id. at 829.
60 Id. at 829–30.
61 Id. at 830.
62 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
63 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64 Id. at 855–56.  In these pages, the Court also observed that Roe had facilitated
the “ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation,” which, although a valid concern, does not appear to fit the same niche as
“reliance interest[s]” in “organiz[ing] intimate relationships.” Id at 856.
65 Id. at 855, 857–59.
66 Id. at 860.
67 Id. at 861–64.
68 Id. at 865–70.  This rationale is, to say the least, controversial. See infra note 87
and accompanying text.
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Roe v. Wade seemed dubious, or at least the dissenters thought so.69
They disagreed with the idea that a constitutional decision ought to
rest on alleged “reliance interests” in a continuation of the right to
abortion because of the way that some people had “organized inti-
mate relationships.”70  At its most generous, this argument would
seem to require only a nine-month delay in the implementation of an
overruling decision,71 and furthermore, the argument is subject to the
objection implied in the question, “who on Earth ‘organizes’ their
‘intimate relationships’ in reliance on Supreme Court decisions, and
especially, on the right to abortion in particular?”  Then too, several
of the criteria could have been answered in the opposite way, because
the Planned Parenthood Court actually rejected the basic premise of
Roe, according to the dissenters, by holding that abortion was not a
“‘fundamental’ right[ ],”72 and indeed, the Court restructured the
entire apparatus of protections for pregnancy termination.73  Even the
“factual underpinnings” of Roe could be said to have been under-
mined by technology; Justice O’Connor, one of the authors of Planned
Parenthood, had written in another case that technology had set Roe on
a “collision course with itself.”74  Furthermore, Planned Parenthood
omitted to analyze some of the criteria in other decisions.  If close
votes and spirited dissents like those in Roe were indeed justifications
for overruling that decision, as Payne suggests, perhaps Justice
O’Connor should have reached the opposite result.75
But mushiness is a frequent characteristic of constitutional deci-
sions, and unavoidably so.76  In any event, Payne and Planned
69 Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 993–95 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
70 Id. at 956 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71 The majority, through Justice O’Connor, did address this question, largely by
expanding the reliance criterion beyond what might easily be called reliance interests.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
72 Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S at 951 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)).
73 Id. at 993–95 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recounting
the dismantling of various alleged protections in Roe).
74 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
75 Planned Parenthood was a five-to-four decision. Roe itself involved a splintered
Court, two separate concurrences, and “spirited” dissents by Justices Rehnquist and
White.
76 Cf. David Crump, Takings by Regulation: How Should Courts Weigh the Balancing
Factors?, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 3 (2012) (arguing that an unrelated constitutional
doctrine—the ad hoc balancing test for takings under the Fifth Amendment’s Tak-
ings Clause—is “vague” and “mushy,” but that a test for this issue will “necessarily” be
expressed in a “multifactor balancing test, however vague it may be”).
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Parenthood both suggest that the overruling of an existing decision
should not be undertaken without careful consideration of the crite-
ria expressed in those opinions.  In the present context, the applica-
tion of those criteria can readily justify the overruling of Crawford, as
the conclusion in this article will show.  But by way of contrast, Justice
Scalia did not consider those criteria in overruling Roberts, the deci-
sion that Crawford itself overruled.  Perhaps his reason was that the
criteria would not have supported the result he reached, as the next
section will show.
B. Did the Criteria Justify the Overruling of Roberts in Crawford?
One might think that in jettisoning a decision such as Ohio v.
Roberts, one that was part of such a long chain of similarly reasoned
cases, the Court would have examined the Payne-Planned Parenthood
factors carefully.  But in Crawford, Justice Scalia undertook no analysis
whatsoever of these criteria.  The only occasions upon which he men-
tioned any of the factors was in offering support for his own conclu-
sions.  For example, he criticized Roberts as producing “unpredictable”
results, but not in the context of the factors that Payne and Planned
Parenthood had identified; in fact, he did not cite those opinions.77
Furthermore, he acknowledged that the Roberts line of decisions had
produced results “largely consistent” with his own view of the Con-
frontation Clause,78 a conclusion that hardly fits with the label of
unpredictability.  And an examination of the Payne and Planned
Parenthood factors, had Justice Scalia performed it, would have
required retaining the Roberts holding.
First, the Roberts line of decisions had not proved to be “unwork-
able.”  The reliability rationale had supported a significant series of
holdings, and Justice Scalia himself admitted that the decisions were
not inappropriate.  “[I]n their outcomes,” he conceded, the cases had
“hew[ed] close[ ] to the . . . line” that his own analysis would draw.79
As for whether these decisions were “badly reasoned,” that criticism
had not been leveled at the reliability doctrine before, and their con-
formity to what even Justice Scalia admitted were sensible results con-
77 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004). See infra Conclusion (discuss-
ing the application of the Payne-Planned Parenthood factors).
78 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57.
79 Id. at 58;.see also id. at 59 (stating that “[o]ur cases have . . . remained faithful
to the Framers’ understanding”); id. at 60 (repeating that decisions have been “faith-
ful” to the original meaning).
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tradicts the conclusion.80  Second, the Roberts line of cases did
concern constitutional decisions of a kind that were difficult for a leg-
islature to overturn.  This factor must be one of the lesser considera-
tions, however, because otherwise, most constitutional decisions
would be due little deference under the doctrine of stare decisis.
Third, reliance interests were significant, at least as compared to those
recognized in Planned Parenthood as sufficiently forceful to tip the
scale.  If reliance on the availability of abortion beyond nine months
in the “organiz[ing of] intimate relationships” could be evaluated as a
weighty consideration in Planned Parenthood, then surely the reliance
of every jurisdiction in creating its criminal codes, training investiga-
tors, collecting evidence for prosecution—processes that take years to
mature—qualify more obviously as significant reliance interests,
despite their fitting the category of procedure and evidence
regulations.81
Fourth, although some precise holdings had produced divided
Courts, the reliability rationale itself had been neither the subject of
narrowly prevailing votes nor of many “spirited dissents;” the replace-
ment of reliability with the testimonial-nontestimonial criterion was
not a major consideration until Crawford,82 and it did not surface until
long after the reliability test had been well established.  Fifth, the Rob-
erts approach had not been a particular subject of confusion in the
lower courts.  In fact, when the lower courts “got it wrong” by admit-
ting evidence that the reliability approach should have excluded, as in
Crawford itself, the proper result was not difficult for the Court to
identify.83  As the Crawford dissenters pointed out, the exclusion of the
evidence in Crawford itself followed easily from the reliability rationale
of Roberts.84  Justice Scalia did not need to depart from Roberts, even in
Crawford, to produce the result he preferred.
Thus, the retention of Roberts in Crawford should have resulted
from a faithful following of the stare decisis factors identified in Payne.
The same holding would have resulted if Justice Scalia had applied
80 In White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364–66 (1992), Justice Thomas, joined by
Justice Scalia, introduced the testimonial-nontestimonial distinction in a concurring
opinion but did not label the decisions following Roberts as “badly reasoned.”
81 Cf. infra notes 157–63 and accompanying text (describing “chaotic” effects on
organization of state data collection efforts and on testimony concerning evidence).
82 See supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing the introduction of the
distinction by two Justices in one opinion).
83 Cf. White, 502 U.S. at 346 (basing the majority holding on the Roberts reliability
test); id. at 358–66 (Thomas, J., concurring) (basing his concurrence on the testimo-
nial-nontestimonial distinction to reach same result).
84 Justice Scalia wrote, in fact, “[w]e readily concede” this point. Crawford, 541
U.S. at 67.
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the additional factors in the later Planned Parenthood decision.  No
“evolution of legal principle” comparable to the decisions between
Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education had turned the relia-
bility rationale into “an anachronism.”  On the contrary, Crawford was
an abrupt departure, not made necessary by any principles other than
those created by Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Crawford itself.85  There
had been no technological revolution that had undermined the “fac-
tual underpinnings” of the reliability rationale.86  And finally, there
were no political considerations that would have made the Court
appear weak if it had retained Roberts, even assuming that there is any
validity whatsoever in this dubious factor,87 which consults political
appearances as a criterion for overruling or refusing to overrule, as
opposed to accurate reasoning.
As has been observed repeatedly, stare decisis is not “an inexorable
command.”88  Even if most of these factors counseled retention of
existing doctrine, the overruling of an egregiously bad decision might
be justified.  Thus, if Justice Scalia’s creation of the testimonial-nontes-
timonial criterion as the key to Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
were highly persuasive in demonstrating the error of earlier ways, and
if it had rationalized later decisions in a substantially more predictable
way, it might have supported the overruling of Roberts.  Unfortunately,
however, the Crawford decision is itself deeply flawed, as the next sec-
tion of this article will demonstrate.
III. FLAWED REASONING IN THE CRAWFORD OPINION
The reasoning in Crawford uses textual and prudential methods,
but its principal reliance is on history.89  Justice Scalia examines law
before the adoption of the Bill of Rights to determine that the motiva-
tion of the Confrontation Clause was not reliability as a substantive
value, but the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial
85 See supra notes 80, 82 and accompanying text (discussing the scarcity of sugges-
tions about the testimonial rationale before Crawford).
86 In other words, changes in the technological nature of evidence had occurred,
but they had not changed the way that Roberts fit the jurisprudence.  In fact, their
change was arguably less relevant than changes in technology were to Roe.  See supra
note 74 and accompanying text.
87 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996–1001 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (containing Justice Scalia’s criti-
cism of this factor).  The vehemence of this part of the dissent has to be read to be
believed.
88 Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 854 (citations omitted) (internal quotations
omitted); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
89 See supra authority cited in note 39.
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hearsay, together with the procedural protection of cross examination
for the former.90  But as the next section of this article will show, Jus-
tice Scalia’s examination of history is selective and, in some instances,
demonstrably wrong.
A. The Admissibility of Numerous Kinds of Testimonial Hearsay,
Contrary to Assertions in Crawford
One unambiguous example of erroneous reasoning in Crawford
concerns the assertion that testimonial evidence was excluded by blan-
ket application under pre-constitutional law in the absence of cross
examination.  The only exception to this principle, Justice Scalia
claims, was dying declarations91—which might be considered testimo-
nial, but were admitted on grounds of the two main criteria of hearsay
admissibility: reliability and necessity.92  Unfortunately, Justice Scalia
is flatly wrong in this assertion.  There are (and were) other such
exceptions.  For example, admissions of a party opponent were
another species of hearsay that often were obviously testimonial under
Justice Scalia’s proffered test, but voluntary confessions were admitted
liberally through a hearsay exception under pre-constitutional proce-
dures.93  Confessions of criminal defendants have continued to be an
exception to hearsay exclusion, just as surely as dying declarations,
from the adoption of the Constitution to the present day.  If confes-
sions comply with other requirements of the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments, the Confrontation Clause is not an obstacle.94  Justice Scalia’s
omission of this additional testimonial variety of admissible hearsay
might, conceivably, have resulted from the treatment of admissions
under the current Federal Rules of Evidence, which define them as
90 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50–54 (2004).
91 Id. at 56 & n.6.
92 E.g., State v. Chaplin, 286 A.2d 325, 329–31 (Me. 1972) (citing State v. Borde-
leau, 108 A. 464, 465 (Me. 1920)) (stating that reliability flows from the “circumstan-
tial guaranty” of trustworthiness in the knowledge that declarant is about to die and
discussing necessity of evidence which is “sometimes the strongest and even the only”
proof).
93 See Griffin v. State, 496 S.E.2d 480, 483–84 (Ga. 1998) (reviewing history of
voluntary confession admissibility, which was “transplanted to the American colo-
nies”); Harris v. State, 342 A.2d 305, 309 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (citing Lambros v.
Coolahan, 45 A.2d 96, 98 (1945)) (observing that oral admissions of a party are “uni-
versally” admissible); Commonwealth v. Babbitt, 723 N.E.2d 17, 23 (Mass. 2000)
(observing that even adoptive admissions being treated as an exception to the hearsay
rule is a practice that is at least two centuries old); 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1048–49 (James J. Chadbourne ed., 1972).
94 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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exemptions from the hearsay definition rather than exceptions.95  In
other words, the Rules now categorize confessions as non-hearsay.
But the definitional treatment of admissions is irrelevant to their char-
acter as testimonial evidence96 that has not been cross-examined and
that should, therefore, be excluded then and now, by Justice Scalia’s
reasoning, although they were not and are not.  And if that is not
enough, the treatment of admissions and confessions at the threshold
of the Constitution was actually as hearsay, but as excepted from the
hearsay rule, just as were dying declarations.97  The Crawford opinion
reserves the question whether admitting dying declarations violates
the Confrontation Clause.98  Perhaps it also should have reserved the
question whether admissions and confessions are unconstitutional evi-
dence, except that this reservation would have revealed an intolerable
flaw in the opinion.
And admissions and confessions are by no means the only kind of
testimonial hearsay that has been admitted for many centuries.  Busi-
ness records, public records, and recorded recollection also some-
times can be testimonial, but it would make no sense to exclude them
for this reason.  Imagine, for example, a prosecution of a defendant
for allegedly practicing medicine without a license.  The underlying
facts are that the defendant once held a physician’s license, but it was
revoked.  The prosecution of this case will require the reception of
public records99 showing these facts.  But the records were made pre-
cisely for the purpose of evidencing what they assert, and thus, they
are testimonial.  The reasoning in Crawford would exclude this evi-
dence.  And since it is unlikely that living declarants can be found to
testify to the chain of events leading to the memorialization of the
evidence, Crawford would make the crime of practicing medicine with-
out a license unprosecutable—in fact, it would make any crime
depending on the absence of a license, permit, or similar governmen-
tal action requiring memorialization unprosecutable.
Similar examples could be constructed from scenarios in which
the serial numbers of drug buy money are written into public records,
precisely because they are expected to become evidence that no live
witness can remember, or in which they are written into field notes
95 FED. R. EVID. 801(d).
96 PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, MYRNA S. RAEDER & DAVID CRUMP, EVIDENCE: CASES, MATER-
IALS & PROBLEMS 522 (3d ed. 2006) (“[C]onceptually it is just as possible to treat
[admissions] as hearsay and ask whether there should be an exception for them.”).
97 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
98 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004).
99 These are excepted from the hearsay rule of exclusion by FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
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that become recorded recollection;100 and there could be situations in
which business records memorialize events or numbers to furnish
proof of crimes involving fraudulent uses of credit cards.  In fact,
many other kinds of hearsay exceptions are potentially admissible on
reliability grounds even when they contain elements indicating a moti-
vation to create or preserve evidence.  Consider an unavailable victim
of domestic violence who breathlessly tells a 911 operator what the
perpetrator has done to her, pleads for immediate help, and then
adds, “I want to see him put away where he can’t do this to me ever
again!,” or a now-deceased third-party witness to an ongoing crime
who provides an in-time narrative to police through a wire.  Reception
of these items of evidence historically could have been supported by
reference to the excited utterance and present sense impression
exceptions, even if they have testimonial aspects.  Justice Scalia’s asser-
tion that only the dying declaration exception contravened his selec-
tive history was simply wrong.
Furthermore, contrary to the reasoning of Crawford, these exam-
ples of proper evidence historically were not admitted on the basis of
a testimonial-nontestimonial distinction, even if the declarants were
not cross-examined. Instead, they resulted from applications of the
most common rationales for admitting categories of hearsay: trustwor-
thiness and necessity.101  The trustworthiness prong of this policy is
exactly the long-historied feature of Roberts that Justice Scalia claimed
in Crawford was irrelevant to history: the testing of categories of admis-
sible hearsay by the existence of circumstantial indicia of reliability.
These examples, in addition to the example of dying declarations that
Justice Scalia treated as aberrational, demonstrate a serious flaw in the
reasoning that supports Crawford.  Since the straightforward applica-
tion of Crawford would make important categories of evidence inad-
missible and some crimes unprosecutable, they also expose failures in
that decision on prudential grounds.
100 The author was involved in such a case.  The officer’s field notes recorded
serial numbers from a number of $100 bills.  Few people could remember the serial
number of a single bill, much less numerous ones.  Therefore, the officer’s notes of
the numbers were admitted pursuant to a state-law equivalent of FED. R. EVID. 803(5),
as a Recorded Recollection.  But the notes were written precisely to create evidence
that could be used in a later prosecution, although Justice Scalia’s approach would
have made them inadmissible—and the crime virtually unprosecutable.
101 See supra note 92 for a discussion of State v. Chaplin and the reliability basis of
dying declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule and note 93 for a discussion of
Griffin v. State, which shows that reliability is the historical basis for admissions and
confessions.  As to reliability as the basis, also, for admitting recorded recollection,
business records, and public records, see ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 96, at 607–10,
616–31, 635–39.
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B. Additional Historical Issues in Crawford: The Persistence of the
Reliability Inquiry
Justice Scalia grounded his analysis of history on the trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh for conspiracy against the crown.102  That case was
indeed a shameful episode that tarnishes the tradition of English
criminal procedure, but it does not demonstrate the irrelevance of
reliability in the admissibility of evidence.  On the contrary, the poten-
tial criticisms of that trial go well beyond the concerns of the Confron-
tation Clause, and they include an important concern with the
reliability of evidence.
Justice Scalia reported about only that part of Raleigh’s trial
involving written accusations by Lord Cobham, who was Raleigh’s
alleged accomplice and was in custody nearby.103  Raleigh asked for
Cobham to be produced,104 and this part of the story is indeed about
cross-examination.  The Court overruled Raleigh and received Cob-
ham’s affidavit.  But Justice Scalia omitted another part of the story, in
which Raleigh objected on reliability grounds instead.  The testimony
at issue repeated the statement of an unidentified “Portugal gen-
tleman” who accused Raleigh of treason: “Don Raleigh will cut [the
King’s] throat . . . .”105
When Raleigh objected to the repetition of that extrajudicial
remark made in Portugal by an absent person who could not be
clearly identified, he spoke only about reliability.  The hearsay state-
ment accusing Raleigh of treason, he argued, had been made by an
unknown “beggarly Priest” or “wild Jesuit,” but, as Raleigh put it,
“[W]hat proof is it against me?”106  Justice Scalia omitted this passage
from his recounting of the case in Crawford, perhaps because it does
not fit his theory.  The concern that Raleigh expressed was not that he
was unable to cross-examine the Portuguese declarant or that the
remark had been testimonial; instead, it was that the hearsay in ques-
tion was unreliable: “what proof” did it provide?  This omitted part of
Raleigh’s Case, in other words, would have supported retaining the Rob-
erts reliability approach, which Justice Scalia was determined to reject.
Furthermore, Raleigh’s Case is distasteful for still other reasons
unrelated to the testimonial-nontestimonial distinction.  The crime at
issue was one that was incompatible with modern or democratic think-
102 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44–45.
103 Id.
104 Raleigh’s Case, 2 HOWELL’S ST. TR. 1, 15–16, 24 (1603); see also 1 D. JARDINE,
CRIMINAL TRIALS 435–520 (1832).
105 See 1 D. JARDINE, supra note 104, at 436.
106 Id.
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ing, in that it charged a vague kind of criticism of the government,
and, further, it was prosecuted in front of judges who were controlled
by the king rather than independent.  This factor was as much a rea-
son for condemnation of the trial as its procedures.  Then, too, the
trial featured the reception of written materials, here in affidavit form,
made under judicial or prosecution supervision, which was far more a
concern arising from Raleigh’s Case than a generalized testimonial-
nontestimonial distinction.107
This is not to suggest that the testimonial nature of evidence, or
the cross-examination of its declarant, was historically irrelevant.
Cross-examination was an important factor that tended to guarantee
reliability.  The foundation of many of the criteria for hearsay excep-
tions is the so-called sincerity risk, or the concern that the declarant
might deliberately falsify his statement to create evidence.108  Thus,
excited utterances are admissible because they are considered reliable
on the ground that spontaneity operates to prevent mendacity.109  In
fact, the historical examples that Justice Scalia offers can, by and large,
be explained by the principle that reliability (or reliability and neces-
sity) is the touchstone of hearsay exceptions, including dying declara-
tions, confessions, and business or public records prepared to
memorialize facts that may become objects of litigation, and cross-
examination is one of the factors that may indicate reliability.  But
historically, reliability also could be shown by the absence of a sincer-
ity risk even without cross-examination.  Perhaps the part of Raleigh’s
Case that Justice Scalia selected does not show a concern for receiving
hearsay, but only with relying on hearsay that is unreliable by reason
of the sincerity risk.
107 In fact, Justice Scalia’s opinion reflects this historical fact: ex parte depositions
and affidavits produced the most abuses. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43–49.
108 Stoddard v. State, 850 A.2d 406, 422 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (“[T]he sincer-
ity risk . . . is the major concern of the hearsay rule.”); see Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay
Rule at Work: Has It Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Decision?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 473,
486–87 (1992); Peter F. Valori, The Meaning of “Bad Faith” Under the Exceptions to the
Hearsay Rule, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 481, 504 (1993).
109 See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 248 P.3d 362, 370 (Okla. Crim. App. 2011)) (“Excited
utterances are excepted from the rule against hearsay because ‘the spontaneity of the
statement[s] in relation to the exciting event gives rise to trustworthiness’.” (quoting
McCalip v. State, 778 P.2d 488, 490 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989)); State v. Echols, No.
2010AP2626–CR, 2011 WL 4445635, at *6 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2011) (“[The
excited utterance exception] ‘is based upon spontaneity and stress’ which, like the
bases for all exceptions to the hearsay rule, ‘endow such statements with sufficient
trustworthiness to overcome the reasons for exclusion of hearsay.’” (quoting State v.
Huntington, 575 N.W.2d 268 (Wis. 1998))).
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IV. THE CASES FOLLOWING CRAWFORD: JUDICIAL FUDGING TO
REACH SENSIBLE RESULTS
These considerations, together with the dissent in Crawford, show
the dubious reasoning upon which that decision stands.  But another
reason for overruling Crawford, perhaps a greater reason, is that it has
proven unworkable.  The later decisions have reached sensible results
only through the most transparent kind of judicial fudging—so trans-
parent, in fact, that Justice Scalia himself has denounced it.  Commen-
tators, including those who seem to support the Crawford decision
itself, have described the results with terms such as “unstable” and
“chaos.”110
A. The Court’s Subjective-Objective Inquiry into Mixed Motives of
Declarants: How Workable?
One fundamental problem with the testimonial-nontestimonial
distinction is that the declarant may have mixed motives.  The victim
of domestic violence may wish to be rescued from her predicament,
while at the same time she would like to ensure future safety, and she
may consider that this future result may be attained by the confine-
ment of a perpetrator for a long time.  This mixed-motive problem
arose in the companion cases of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v.
Indiana.111  Both cases involved domestic violence, but perhaps to
prove that it knew the difference, the Court held that the victim’s
statement in Hammon was testimonial but that the statement in Davis
was not.  In the latter case, Michelle McCottry called 911 and stated
that she had just been assaulted by Davis, her former boyfriend, who
had beat her with his fists and had just fled the scene.112  According to
the Court, this statement was nontestimonial.  It was to be considered,
however, not by whether it really was testimonial—by the subjective
intentions of the declarant, that is—but instead by objective indicators
of those intentions,113 because the subjective mind of the declarant
was too difficult to investigate in court and would produce too much
variance in results. The objective factors that the Court referred to
were that the statement concerned “ongoing” events, “as they were
110 See Michael H. Graham, Confrontation Clause—Crawford/Davis/Melendez-Diaz:
2010 Application Summary—Recent Chaos, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 1334 (2010) (noting the
resulting “chaos”); Widdison, supra note 4, at 240 (calling the results “unstable”).
111 547 U.S. 813, 829–830 (2006).
112 Id. at 817–20.  This and other statements from the evidence, below, are taken
from this section of the majority opinion.
113 Id. at 826–827.
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actually happening,” even though this assertion was untrue.114  The
use of the statement as evidence was completely confined to events in
the past, i.e., the assault.  In fact, the declarant said, “He’s runnin’
now,”115 a statement that shows the judicial fudging necessary to reach
the result.
Furthermore, said the Court, the environment was “not tranquil”
or even safe.116  And McCottry’s statement was not the result of a for-
mal inquiry,117 even though the 911 operator forcefully told the
declarant, “Stop talking and answer my questions.”118  Davis was con-
victed of felony violation of a domestic no-contact order, and the
Court left his conviction undisturbed.
Amy Hammon made a similar kind of statement to police
officers, and although the circumstances differed in a few particulars,
the question remained whether those differences should have made a
difference.  For one thing, when the officers arrived and Amy was in
front of her husband, she told them that nothing was wrong.119  The
officers separated the two, and Amy then made a statement describing
the assault upon her, with her husband still present in the next room.
(She also completed an affidavit after making the statements, and the
affidavit should have been inadmissible under traditional law.)120  An
officer’s repetition of Amy’s statements was part of the evidence
against Hammon, and so was her (less likely to be properly admissi-
ble) affidavit.121  The Indiana Supreme Court held that Amy’s state-
ments met the criteria for an excited utterance,122 and this holding
seems unremarkable.  The United States Supreme Court, however,
held that Amy’s statements, unlike those in Davis, were testimonial
and therefore not admissible.123
This result allegedly followed from the test that the Court had
used to analyze Davis’s statements.  This test, said the Court,
depended upon the “primary purpose” of the declarant.124  Because
the state of mind of a declarant may include mixed motives, it is only
by focusing on the primary purpose of the statement that the court
114 Id. at 827.
115 Id. at 818.
116 Id. at 827.
117 Id. at 828.
118 Id. at 818.
119 Id. at 819.
120 Id. at 821.
121 Id. at 820.
122 Id. at 821.
123 Id. at 830.
124 Id. at 822.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL103.txt unknown Seq: 20  8-NOV-12 12:21
134 notre dame law review [vol. 88:1
can achieve consistent results and, not coincidentally, avoid appearing
as a collection of amateur mind-readers.  Furthermore, as Davis had
required, the primary purpose was to be tested by objective factors:
again, to avoid inquiry into the unknowable realm of subjective moti-
vations.  The trouble with this reasoning, as is borne out by the
Court’s analysis in Hammon, is that the allegedly objective factors are
likely to be so mushy, and the primary purpose so mixed with other
purposes, that the decision whether the statement is testimonial is
likely to be arguable either way with equal validity.
Following these principles, the Court decided that Amy Ham-
mon’s motive was testimonial because it was backward-looking,
describing an event as part of a potential prosecution, rather than a
part of an ongoing situation in which the basic question was whether
some sort of protection of the declarant was needed.125  But why?  The
officers might have decided that the proper solution was to move Amy
to a women’s shelter, or to undertake some similar measure; in fact,
the Court hinted at the likelihood that officers might need to remove
a victim from “possible danger.”126  If the Court had considered, it
might have realized that often, in situations such as these, officers his-
torically have merely separated the two people without prosecuting.
In fact, Justice Thomas explicitly analyzed this likely police response
in his dissent.127
The Court’s reliance on Amy’s false statement that “things were
fine” and on its description of the atmosphere as “at some remove in
time from the danger” is flatly farfetched.128  After being assaulted,
calling the police, waiting for them to arrive, being confronted by the
officers entering her home, feeling forced to lie by her assailant’s
presence, being separated from him but still close to him, and having
to admit to strangers that an offensive and embarrassing episode of
domestic violence had injured her, Amy Hammon could have been
labeled “not tranquil,” exactly as McCottry was, by any honest analyst
purporting to use “objective” methods.  The more realistic assessment
of the situation was that of the Indiana Supreme Court, which recog-
nized the stress under which Amy was speaking and characterized her
statement as an excited utterance.  In short, the Court’s distinction
between Michelle McCottry’s statements and those of Amy Hammon
is arbitrary.  A court easily could have made a pair of opposite conclu-
125 Id. at 829–30.
126 Id. at 832.  The affidavit, it should be added, seems much more likely to have
been a substitute for testimony and more likely to have implicated core historical
concerns. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
127 Hammon, 547 U.S. at 841 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 830, 832 (majority opinion).
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sions by considering such factors as the continued presence of the
assailant in Amy’s case, whereas in Davis, the assailant was gone; or the
fact he was her husband, which therefore could have been the cause
of motives that were mixed more than usual; or the objective indica-
tion of her fright expressed in her initial falsehoods.
Justice Thomas dissented as to the exclusion of Amy’s oral state-
ments.  The majority’s approach, he concluded, was “neither workable
nor a targeted attempt to reach the abuses forbidden by the [Con-
frontation] Clause.”129  An approach that dealt with those abuses by
excluding trial by ex parte affidavit (or by similar formal declarations
such as depositions) would have been more consistent with the pur-
pose of the clause.130  Assigning a label such as testimonial to the
“largely unverifiable motives” of a declarant to divine which thought
was “primary” implied a search for a “hierarchy of purpose that will
rarely be present—and is not reliably discernible.”  The attempt to do
so by purposely “objective” factors, Justice Thomas added, amounts to
“an exercise in fiction.”131
Just how unworkable was the Davis clarification of Crawford? The
answer came in Michigan v. Bryant.132  There, the victim, mortally
wounded, identified and described the man who had shot him in a
statement to police.133  Using the objective test for primary purpose
that the Supreme Court had created in Davis, the Michigan Supreme
Court held that the victim’s statement was testimonial, and it reversed
Bryant’s murder conviction.  The Michigan court reasoned that the
statement was backward-looking, like the label imposed on Amy Ham-
mon’s statement: a description of past events, designed to establish
facts rather than facilitate present action.134  Although this result
departed from history and tradition, and although the statement
would readily and sensibly have been admitted under a reliability test
as an excited utterance, dying declaration, or residual hearsay qualify-
ing for reception, the Michigan court excluded it under Crawford by
reasoning that, although dubious, it was faithful to that decision and
to Davis.135  Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court’s
approach in those cases misled the Michigan court and made that
court produce a result that fit neither the Constitution nor common
sense.  Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court disagreed with
129 Id. at 842 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 835–37.
131 Id. at 839.
132 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
133 Id. at 1150.
134 Id. at 1151.
135 Id. at 1150–51.
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the outcome that its reasoning had produced, by recognizing an
“ongoing emergency” exception to the testimonial characteriza-
tion.136  In doing so, the Court distinguished its decision in Hammon
v. Indiana in part on the dubious ground that Hammon concerned a
domestic dispute whereas the present case concerned a nondomestic
dispute.137
The Bryant Court also listed a number of factors that lower courts
could consult to determine the existence of an ongoing emergency,
including the type of weapon (gun versus fists; apparently, police
officers do not need to know that a suspect is likely to assault them by
hand), the victim’s injuries (if the assailant shot and missed, the state-
ment is less likely to be testimonial than if his aim had been true),
whether an interrogation took place (a search for a perpetrator is less
likely to involve testimonial statements if the victim initiates the
description than if police officers first ask, “What happened?”), and
the formality of the setting (a doctor’s structured inquiry into the
causes of an emergency department patient’s injuries might be more
likely testimonial).138  Whether these dicta would prove helpful to the
lower courts remained to be seen.
In any event, Michigan v. Bryant is a compelling illustration of the
unworkability that is built into the Crawford rationale.  It is sophistry to
claim that police officers who pursue a domestic abuser are relatively
safe and that those who pursue an assailant who lives elsewhere from
his victim are not.  In fact, domestic abuse calls are dangerous for
police officers.  As for the extent of the victim’s injuries, it is nonsense
to suggest that the public and officers are safer if the assailant shot
and missed rather than happening to kill the victim.  The idea that
fists are less dangerous than firearms may be true in most cases, but
how that factor becomes an objective indicator of nontestimonial
motivation behind a victim’s statement is a mystery.  The only factor
mentioned by the Court that seems to have any validity is formality.
But no one needed a Supreme Court opinion to tell them that a for-
mal setting such as a police interrogation room was an indicator of
excludable hearsay, and indeed this conclusion would have followed
more clearly from a reliability test.
The trouble with the testimonial-nontestimonial distinction as
applied in Michigan v. Bryant is that it focuses, as did Crawford, on
subjective motivation, which is impossible to discern consistently, and
that it attempts to determine subjective motivation by objective fac-
136 Id. at 1156 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)).
137 Id. at 1158–59.
138 Id. at 1158–62.
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tors, following Davis, in spite of the ambiguity that objective factors
produce.  In other words, the Supreme Court attempted to read the
deceased victim’s mind from the distant view of a courtroom, and it
used factors that can always be argued either way, as the discussion
above shows.  Again, Justice Thomas concurred only in the judgment,
reiterating his statement in Davis that the primary purpose test was an
“exercise in fiction” and calling for a return to the historical concern
of the Confrontation Clause: ex parte witness examinations.139  Justice
Ginsburg, in dissent, focused on the intent of the officers, concluding
that because they “viewed their encounter with [the victim as] an
investigation,” the victim’s statements became testimonial, even
though she pronounced that the intent of the victim was “what
counts.”140  The decision, she said, “confounds our recent Confronta-
tion Clause jurisprudence” by bringing back a focus on reliability.141
Finally, Justice Scalia’s dissent almost has to be read to be appre-
ciated in its vitriol.  It accuses the Court of using an “active imagina-
tion” to produce a “story . . . so transparently false that professing to
believe it demeans this institution.”142  Justice Scalia’s dissent lacks
only his recognition that the otherworldly quality of the majority rea-
soning was produced by Justice Scalia’s own creation of an unwork-
able and misguided doctrine.  It was only by judicial fudging that the
majority was able to wedge a sensible result into something that con-
formed to the testimonial-nontestimonial approach.
B. The Court’s Approach to Multiple-Author Technical Documents:
How Workable?
An entirely different sort of challenge to Crawford’s workability
appeared in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.143  The defendant was con-
victed of cocaine distribution, with the fact that the substance in his
possession was cocaine being proved by “certificates” from chemical
analysts.  A plurality of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, rea-
soned that this practice violated the Confrontation Clause because the
certificates were testimonial.  The plurality rejected the state’s argu-
ment that the certificates were not those of “conventional” witnesses
on the ground that there was no basis for distinction between facts
139 Id. at 1167 (Thomas, J., concurring).
140 Id. at 1176 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 1168, 1172–73 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
141 Id. at 1176–77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 1168, 1172 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
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observed at the crime scene and those observed in the laboratory.144
Predictions that this holding would result in skyrocketing costs of
prosecutions were “irrelevant,” and, in any event, were belied, accord-
ing to the plurality, by the practice in many states, which allegedly
complied already with the plurality’s requirements.145
After Crawford, the holding in Melendez-Diaz seemed unremark-
able, even if its result was debatable.  The testimonial character of the
certificates there seemed mandated by the definition of testimonial
statements in Crawford as those seeking to “establish facts.”146 Never-
theless, the unworkability of the Crawford testimonial-nontestimonial
distinction became evident in the surprising fact that five members of
the Court—a majority—rejected the reasoning that supported the
holding.  Justice Thomas concurred only on the separate ground that
he had staked out earlier: that the Confrontation Clause should be
interpreted as extending primarily to trial by affidavit, which the use
of certificates resembled.147  And four Justices dissented, in an opin-
ion by Justice Kennedy. The dissenters pointed out, first, that the con-
traband in question might have been handled by at least four
different persons in the chemist’s office, “[a]nd each of the four has
power to introduce error.”148  There often is a sampler, an inter-
preter, a calibrator (who might be an outside contractor), and a
supervisor who certifies the procedures used to obtain the result.149
Must all four appear?  If not, which of the four must appear?  As the
dissenters pointed out, the Crawford opinion suggests that all four
must testify live because “the testimonial statement of one witness
[cannot] enter into evidence through the in-court testimony of a sec-
ond . . . .”150  If so, the Court had, “for all practical purposes, forbid-
den the use of scientific tests in criminal trials.”151
Furthermore, the dissenters pointed out that the plurality had
fudged the results in its consideration of chain-of-custody evidence
and authentication of documents.  Both of these essential functions
traditionally had depended upon evidence made unlawful by the plu-
144 Id. at 306.
145 Id. at 328.  The Court also rejected arguments to the effect that the affidavits
were not “prone to . . . distortion or manipulation” because they resulted from “scien-
tific testing,” id. at 317, that they resembled business records, id. at 321, and that the
defendant could have subpoenaed the analysts, id. at 324.
146 Id. at 310.
147 Id. at 329 (Thomas, J., concurring).
148 Id. at 333 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
149 Id.
150 Id. at 334.
151 Id. at 333.
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rality’s reasoning.  Since time immemorial, the chain of custody had
been provable without “each human link” being demonstrated
through live witnesses.152  The plurality finessed this inconvenient fact
by observing that it was “up to the prosecution to decide what steps in
the chain are so crucial as to require evidence;”153 but this was judicial
fudging because, as the dissenters observed, the “case itself deter-
mines” the required proof.154  Yet, the plurality was forced into this
fudging by the disaster that otherwise would occur because often “the
crucial link . . . will not be available.”155  As for documents tradition-
ally certified by clerks—a kind of authentication that does not seem
possible if every human handler must appear live—the plurality
described this clerical function as “narrowly circumscribed.”156  The
dissent regarded this conclusion as “tell[ing] us that something is very
wrong” with the Court’s opinion.157  And a clerk-certified document
may prove an essential element of a crime by itself, such as the fact of
prior conviction in a prosecution for gun possession by a felon; and
the same reasoning, presumably, would need to apply to affidavits
authenticating business or public records, which require a much more
complex sequence of testimony.
The plurality’s treatment of the disruption and cost arguments
also contained judicial fudging according to the dissenters.  Some
jurisdictions, for example, required live testimony only if the defense
disputed the analyst’s result.  But this procedure was disqualified by
the plurality’s reasoning, which disallowed shifting the burden to the
defense.  Thus, the assertion that most states already complied with
the plurality’s opinion was untrue.158  And the potential costs were
staggering.  State courts saw 18,000 drug cases in a year, with many of
those cases resulting in guilty pleas only immediately before
trial–meaning that the analyst had to be immediately available to tes-
tify.  The FBI laboratory at Quantico, Virginia, had 500 analysts who
conducted over a million tests a year in state and federal courts
nationwide.  “The Court’s decision means that before any of those
million tests reaches a jury, at least one of the laboratory’s analysts
must board a plane, find his or her way to an unfamiliar courthouse,
152 Id. at 336
153 Id. at 311 n.1 (majority opinion).
154 Id. at 336 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
155 Id.
156 Id. at 332.
157 Id. at 337.  FED. R. EVID. 902(4) and 902(11) allow authentication of business
and public records by certificates.
158 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 354.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL103.txt unknown Seq: 26  8-NOV-12 12:21
140 notre dame law review [vol. 88:1
and sit there waiting to read aloud notes made months ago.”159  Fur-
thermore, there was the additional difficulty, not considered by the
plurality, that the analyst may be unavailable.  Then, the costs would
exceed monetary outlays.  “Guilty defendants will go free, on the most
technical grounds, as a direct result of today’s decision, adding noth-
ing to the truth-finding process.”160
But the dissenters’ disagreement was far deeper even than this
analysis would suggest.  They believed that the plurality’s “fundamen-
tal mistake” was to accept the Crawford reasoning in the first place:
“The [Confrontation] Clause does not refer to kinds of statements.
Nor does the clause contain the word ‘testimonial.’”161  Instead, the
dissenters wrote, the clause should be applied only to the kind of wit-
ness with which the clause is concerned.  Historically, that witness was
“one who perceived an event that gave rise to a personal belief in
some aspect of the defendant’s guilt.”162  In this respect, the dissent-
ers’ proposed test was closely related to Justice Thomas’s preferred
approach, which focused on trial by arranged statements of witnesses.
Both approaches are related to the sincerity risk.  The infamous trial
of Sir Walter Raleigh was one of the “most notorious instances” that
led to the adoption of the Confrontation Clause, but the offensiveness
of that case proceeded from the use of hearsay statements that
repeated what witnesses who actually saw the alleged “crime” had
said.163  A chemical analyst, by way of contrast, “observes neither the
crime nor any human action related to it.”164
Whether this substitute test would be more workable than the
approaches of either the plurality or Justice Thomas is subject to
debate.  But the significant point is that there now were fully five votes
for overruling Crawford: Justice Thomas, Justice Kennedy, and the
other three dissenters.  The unworkability of Crawford is shown by the
surprising fact that in Melendez-Diaz, the basis of the plurality decision
was Crawford, but a majority of the Court rejected Crawford.
The issues that the plurality swept under the rug in Melendez-Diaz
were certain to surface again.  And they did, in a case called Bullcom-
ing v. New Mexico.165  That case was a driving-while-intoxicated prose-
cution in which the operator of the gas chromatograph that tested the
defendant’s blood did not testify.  The operator had signed a certifi-
159 Id. at 342.
160 Id.
161 Id. 343.
162 Id. at 344.
163 Id. at 344–45.
164 Id. at 346 .
165 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
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cate describing the test and reporting the instrument-produced
results, and the trial court admitted it under the business records
exception to the hearsay rule. Another operator who performed simi-
lar duties appeared before the jury, sponsored the exhibit, and was
available for cross-examination.  The record showed only that the first
operator had been “placed on unpaid leave for an undisclosed rea-
son.”166  A fractured Court reversed the conviction.
In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that the operator was a “mere scrivener” and that the gas chro-
matograph performed the real test.167  In addition to reporting the
numerical result, the operator had to certify that the sample seal was
unbroken and that there was “no circumstance or condition . . . [that]
affect[ed] the integrity of the sample or . . . the validity of the analy-
sis.”168  His certification was “formalized in a signed document,” a fact
that the Court seemed to view not as a circumstance indicating relia-
bility, but as indicative of a Confrontation Clause violation.169  The
Court concluded that these factors made the first operator a witness
and that the ability to cross-examine a witness equally familiar with the
certification process was insufficient.  The Court conceded that the
operator “would not recall a particular test”—in other words, his
response to cross-examination about the particular test would consist
of “I don’t knows,” just as the substitute witness’s probably did—but
observed that he could answer questions about factors such as his own
proficiency.170  The Court failed to recognize that, presumably, the
fellow operator provided as a substitute witness also could do so, and
might have been more forthcoming with criticism.  In Part IV of the
opinion, Justice Ginsburg included assertions that undue costs were
not relevant and that predictions of bad consequences were “dubi-
ous.”171  This Part IV was not the opinion of the Court, however,
because Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, and Kagan, as well as the dis-
senters, declined to join in it.172
Justice Sotomayor wrote a separate concurrence.  She agreed with
the Court’s assertions that the operator was not a mere scrivener and
that substitute cross-examination was insufficient.173  Perhaps the
most significant aspect of her concurrence, however, is her observa-
166 Id. at 2710–12, 2714.
167 Id. at 2714–15.
168 Id. at 2714 (internal citations omitted).
169 Id. at 2714, 2717.
170 Id. at 2715 n.7.
171 Id. at 2717–19.
172 Id. at 2709.
173 Id. at 2721 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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tion that “this is not a case in which the person testifying is a supervi-
sor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited,
connection to the scientific test at issue.”174  She also suggested that
“machine-generated results, such as a printout from a gas chro-
matograph,” might present a different case.175  And she concluded
that it was not necessary “for every person noted on the [test] report
[to] testify.”176
Four justices dissented, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy.  Apart
from their objections in Melendez-Diaz, the dissenters contended that
the extension of that holding in this case was a “serious misstep.”177
First, the certifying operator’s role here was “no greater than that of
anyone else in the chain of custody,” and the Court had held that
chain-of-custody issues did not trigger a requirement of confronta-
tion.178  “Up to 40 analysts” may handle a single sample inside a state’s
testing laboratory.179  Must the prosecution call them all?  Second, the
analysis is mechanically completed by the gas chromatograph itself.
“In these circumstances, requiring the State to call the technician who
filled out a form and recorded the results of a test is a hollow formal-
ity.”180  Furthermore, although the Confrontation Clause was con-
cerned with reliability as its ultimate goal, the Court’s opinion here
ironically treated reliability as a “reason to exclude” evidence rather
than receive it.  The formality and signature of the certification were,
in the Court’s view, a reason to view it as testimonial and therefore
prohibited.181  The reliability test of Roberts had as its purpose the
protection of the ultimate confrontation goal, while allowing the
states to explore and develop sensible evidence rules.  Instead, the
Court now had linked the Confrontation Clause to the earliest, most
rigid, and least refined versions of the hearsay rules.  “For instance,
recent state laws allowing admission of well-documented and sup-
ported reports of abuse by women whose abusers later murdered
them must give way,” unless the state can prove that the murder was
motivated specifically by the foreclosing of testimony.182
Then, there were the “chaotic” effects of the decision on drunk-
driving trials.  From 2008 to 2010, presumably as a result of confronta-
174 Id. at 2722.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 2721 n.2.
177 Id. at 2723 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
178 Id. at 2724.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 2725.
182 Id. at 2727.
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tion decisions, subpoenas requiring New Mexico operators to testify in
impaired-driving cases “rose 71%, to 1,600—or 8 or 9 every workday,”
in that single state.  Operators “now must travel great distances on
most working days.”  Although the dissenters did not analyze the prac-
tical effects on other types of prosecutions, many of which require
technical evidence, they added, “Scarce state resources could be com-
mitted to other urgent needs in the criminal justice system.183
Bullcoming shows not only adverse practical effects and doctrinal
inconsistencies, but also the unworkability of the Crawford approach.
The Court split four ways, if one counts Justice Thomas, who rejects
many results of the Crawford holding.  Justice Sotomayor is the only
justice who suggested the use of substitute witnesses but did not tell us
precisely what kinds would suffice.  Joined with the dissenters, she
could produce a five-justice majority for the reception of evidence that
the positions of Justice Thomas and the rest of the majority would not
adopt.  Or another coalition could result in an unpredictable way.
The result is that crucial issues, such as when an instrumental printout
is sufficient or what kinds of surrogate witnesses are permissible, are
not only left open, but left open without any indication of future con-
sensus on the Court.  This confusion adds to the waste of resources
that is an unavoidable product of the Crawford approach.
C. Descriptions by Commentators of “Chaos” and the Like as Results of
Crawford: How Workable Is Crawford?
Recent descriptions of the Crawford line of cases by commentators
are uniformly uncomplimentary.  Professor Michael Graham, who is
one of our most prolific and careful evidence scholars, refers to the
condition of this jurisprudence as “chaos.”184  Schnapper-Casteras and
Ellis describe what they see as “[t]he trouble with testimoniality,”
which, in their view, includes “the [s]ubjective-[o]bjective [a]mbiguity
and [o]ther [p]roblems.”185  Other writers, some of whom favor the
reinforcement of confrontation rights, nevertheless charge that lower
courts’ efforts to comply with the decisions are “deeply problem-
atic,”186 that the jurisprudence is “unstable,”187 that the doctrine rests
183 Id. at 2728.
184 Graham, supra note 110, at 1334.
185 JP Schnapper-Casteras & David Ellis, The Trouble with Testimoniality: Subjective-
Objective Ambiguity and Other Problems with Crawford’s Third Formulation, 47 CRIM. L.
BULL. No. 6 (Winter 2011).
186 Jesse J. Norris, Who Can Testify About Lab Results After Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming?: Surrogate Testimony and the Confrontation Clause, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 375,
393 (2011).
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on a “shaky foundation,”188 that, without modification, these doc-
trines will enable “guilty defendants to circumvent the law,”189 that the
decisions are “surround[ed]” by “intricacies” so that determining
proper results is “anything but easy,”190 that the “ghost of Roberts” has
produced a confusing “return of reliability” to conflict with the testi-
monial-nontestimonial distinction in such a way that the jurispru-
dence is “unsettling” and “poses practical difficulties in criminal
proceedings across the country,”191 that “[d]ue to this lack of consen-
sus and to the fact-intensive nature of the testimonial inquiry, the
Court may take varied positions before a consistent doctrine
emerges,”192 that the decisions have “sharply divided” the Court and
“likely will continue to do so,”193 that it is “odd” that the Court regards
confrontation as having “nothing to do” with the “ultimate goal” of
reliability,194 and even that the results of Crawford are
“unspeakable.”195
In fact, recent commentators who offer strong praise for the
Crawford approach must be few in number.196  Even those who see
merit in the line of decisions express doubts about its consistency, sta-
bility, and effects. The commentators’ appraisals of the decisions, in
summary, support the conclusion that Crawford is unworkable.
187 Andrew W. Eichner, Note, The Failures of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts and
the Unstable Confrontation Clause, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 437 (2011).
188 Scott, supra note 19, at 1077.
189 Amy Ma, Mitigating the Prosecutors’ Dilemma in Light of Melendez-Diaz: Live Two-
Way Videoconferencing for Analyst Testimony Regarding Chemical Analysis, 11 NEV. L.J. 793,
814 (2011).  For reasons that are beyond the scope of this Article, the author here
doubts that video-conferencing is a viable solution.
190 Marcia G. Cooke, Hearsay After Crawford: A Practitioner’s Guide, 23 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. 509, 530 (2011).
191 Widdison, supra note 4, at 240.
192 Leading Cases, supra note 4, at 261.
193 Robert K. Kry, Confrontation at a Crossroads: Crawford’s Seven-Year Itch, 6
CHARLESTON L. REV. 49, 49 (2012).
194 Josephine Ross, What’s Reliability Got to Do with the Confrontation Clause After
Crawford?, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 383, 425 (2009).
195 Rutherford, supra note 18.
196 In the past, there were commentaries that approved some aspects of Crawford.
See e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Forfeiture of the Confrontation Right After Crawford and
Davis, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 489, 491–92 (2007) (approving these decisions); Christo-
pher B. Mueller, Cross-Examination Earlier or Later: When Is It Enough to Satisfy Craw-
ford?, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 319, 320 (2007) (“Crawford was right to shift the focus . . .
away from reliability . . . .”).  Recently, the commentary has been more unified in
criticizing Crawford. See supra notes 4, 164–75 and accompanying text.
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V. PRUDENTIAL CONCERNS: THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE
CRAWFORD LINE OF CASES
A. Disastrous Results: Does the Constitution Allow the
Courts to Avoid Them?
Justice Scalia, the author of Crawford, suggests that results do not
matter in constitutional interpretation.  For example, in Melendez-Diaz,
he disapproved of considering “‘the necessities of trial and the adver-
sary process.’”  He refused to evaluate whether the Crawford approach
might make prosecutions “more burdensome,” putting that issue in
the same category as burdens caused by the right to jury trial or the
privilege against self-incrimination.197
This reasoning conflated the issues.  Once it is determined that a
particular procedure or result is mandated by the Constitution, it
arguably does not matter whether it is burdensome.  A bill purporting
to be a law that has been adopted by only one house of Congress, for
example, does not become law merely because it is said to embody
important or even crucial legislation. But in determining whether the
Constitution in fact applies in such a way as to require a disastrous
process or result, the courts do consider the result.198  In refusing to
do so—not in considering whether a mandated interpretation must
apply, but in considering whether that interpretation is to be
reached—Justice Scalia departed from sound reasoning and created
legitimate ground for overruling Crawford under the Court’s stare
decisis decisions.
Professor Loewy says that Justice Scalia “reject[s] . . . the rele-
vance of consequences.”199  He gives two examples: the retention of
Miranda v. Arizona, as to which he argues that Justice Scalia would
ignore the consequences for law enforcement or individual rights,
and the constitutionality of capital punishment, as to which he sees
Justice Scalia as indifferent to the possibility of execution of innocent
persons.  He concludes that “opinions reaching such results are fine
197 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 325 (2009) (quoting Brief for
Respondent at 59).
198 The cases are many, but citing two landmark Supreme Court cases will advance
the point. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (relying on result in the form of
“detriment[s] . . . upon the pregnant woman” to justify statement that the right of
privacy is “broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.11 (1954) (consid-
ering results in the form of psychological studies demonstrating severe negative
effects of segregation on African-American children).
199 Arnold H. Loewy, A Tale of Two Justices (Scalia and Breyer), 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
1203, 1208 (2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL103.txt unknown Seq: 32  8-NOV-12 12:21
146 notre dame law review [vol. 88:1
as dissenting opinions. . . . But, I do not believe that historically the
Court has ever ignored consequences.”200  To the extent that Justice
Scalia’s Crawford opinion does so, it is vulnerable to Professor Loewy’s
criticism.  The Constitution, it has often been said, “is not a suicide
pact.”201  It does not require that courts ignore bad results, and the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence often considers consequences that are
far less than disastrous. The results of Crawford are bad enough to
support the conclusion that the decision is unworkable.  For one
thing, Justice Scalia’s approach would admit vast realms of unreliable
hearsay because it means that lack of reliability is irrelevant to the
Confrontation Clause.
B. Free Allowance of Unreliable Hearsay as a Result of Crawford
The Crawford rule is based on a testimonial/nontestimonial
divide.  Testimonial hearsay is subject to the Confrontation Clause.
But by the same token, nontestimonial hearsay is freely admissible as
far as the Crawford opinion is concerned, and the Confrontation
Clause is not sensitive to how bad it is as evidence.  “Where nontesti-
monial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’
design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay
law . . . .”202  Not only does this consequence of Crawford present a
result important enough to amount to a constitutional consideration,
it also is inconsistent with the historical concerns of the Confrontation
Clause.203
For example, one commentator gives the example of a state’s cre-
ation of an “injured person” hearsay exception.  Imagine that the only
evidence of guilt is the repetition of a victim’s statement, made to a
friend, that “last week [the accused] assaulted me . . . . [H]e punched
me and broke my arm.”  “Meeting no currently-existing hearsay excep-
tion, may the statement nonetheless be admitted and serve as the basis
for conviction if a legislature were to create an ‘injured person’ hear-
200 Id. at 1209.
201 See The Constitution Is Not a Suicide Pact, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/ The_Constitution_is_not_a_suicide_pact (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) (citing for-
mulations by Presidents Jefferson and Lincoln, Justices Jackson and Goldberg, and
Judge Posner).
202 E.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981) (holding that the
state’s “relatively weak pecuniary interest” together with its interest in informal proce-
dures overcame the parent’s “important” interest in appointed counsel in termination
proceeding that was not “complex[ ]”).
203 See supra Part III (showing that the historical basis of the Clause included con-
cern for hearsay reliability).
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say exception?”204  The partial answer is that Crawford’s interpretation
of the Confrontation Clause apparently would permit this strange and
historically jarring outcome.  The possibility exists that another provi-
sion, such as the Due Process Clause, might countermand the convic-
tion,205 but there is scant authority for such a result in connection
with hearsay because the problem has been resolved, traditionally, by
reference to the Confrontation Clause.
But the effects of Crawford are even worse than this.  Justice
Scalia’s opinion turns the evaluation of evidence upside down.  In the
topsy-turvy world of Crawford, as Josephine Ross correctly points out,
“the government is free to introduce many types of unreliable accusa-
tions without any right of confrontation attaching,” but “[i]n contrast,
the government is prevented from introducing more reliable types of
out-of-court accusations without producing the live wit-
ness[es] . . . .”206  For example, in Whorton v. Bockting, the Court held
that a statement two days after the crime, which was admitted under a
special statute with no antecedent in the common law, was not to be
tested for reliability after Crawford.207  At the same time, the holding
in Bullcoming means that statements that pose relatively little hearsay
risk, and where there is less to be gained from cross examination of
the specific declaration than with many valid hearsay exceptions, are
inadmissible.208  Furthermore, the Court’s requirements are overbear-
ing enough to make four Justices express the concern that scientific
evidence may be admissible only upon the testimony of as many as
forty (40) witnesses, so that as a practical matter they would “forbid[ ]
the use of scientific tests in criminal trials.”209
In fact, Raleigh’s Case depended in part on testimony that closely
resembles the “injured person” hearsay hypothetical.  In addition to
the affidavit evidence that it received, the judges there permitted the
jury to consider the unconfronted repetition of a chance remark
made in Portugal by an unidentified person who incriminated
Raleigh.  The circumstances indicate that the remark was not testimo-
204 Jules Epstein, Avoiding Trial by Rumor: Identifying the Due Process Threshold for
Hearsay Evidence After the Demise of the Ohio v. Roberts “Reliability” Standard, 77
U.M.K.C. L. REV. 119, 121 (2009).
205 See id. at 131 (suggesting the possibility that another provision, such as the Due
Process Clause, might countermand the conviction).
206 Ross, supra note 194, at 385.
207 549 U.S. 406, 411 & n.1, 418 (2007) (announcing review only of question
whether Crawford conformed to circumstances for collateral attack, not including reli-
ability issues under Crawford).
208 See supra notes 157–63.
209 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 333 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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nial; it simply was gossip for all that appears.210  Raleigh did not object
to it on any ground that had to do with any testimonial-nontestimo-
nial distinction. His objection went to the unreliability of the evi-
dence.211  It is telling that Justice Scalia omitted this part of Raleigh’s
Case from his Crawford opinion.  Contrary to his reasoning there, the
trial of Sir Walter Raleigh—which the Justice treated as a weighty his-
torical concern—shows that reliability was indeed a core concern of
the Confrontation Clause.
C. Pernicious Effects on Crucial Categories of Cases
The destructive effects of Crawford on important kinds of cases
have been discussed thoroughly and require only brief mention here.
The commentators have pointed out that the decision may make
some terrorism trials impossible,212 will have “unspeakable” effects on
child abuse prosecutions,213 and will prevent use of some statements
by victims murdered by the defendants.214  Supreme Court Justices
have pointed out the destructive effects in drunk driving cases, and
indeed, in all cases requiring scientific evidence.215
D. Consequences of the Crawford Line of Cases for the Vanishing Trial
And then, there is the issue of the vanishing trial.  Among the
anomalous statements in the Crawford line of cases, there is one con-
cerning this issue that stands out as particularly inappropriate.  In
Bullcoming, Justice Ginsburg suggested that the impact of the decision
would be minimal because only a “small fraction of . . . cases . . .
210 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
211 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
212 See Scott, supra note 19, at 1078.
213 See Rutherford, supra note 18, at 137.  Rutherford documents a case in which a
child witness required psychiatric treatment after being placed on the witness stand
and breaking down. Id.  Breakdowns from severe stress on children must be relatively
common, because the author has also seen such a case. See DAVID CRUMP & GEORGE
O. JACOBS, A CAPITAL CASE IN AMERICA 157–163 (Carolina Academic Press ed. 2000).
214 In fact, this was the holding in Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 360–61, 377
(2008), because the state had not held that the murder was motivated by prevention
of testimony, so as to invoke the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine. See Graham,
supra note 110 (discussing the Giles holding); Paul W. Grimm & Jerome E. Deise,
Hearsay, Confrontation, and Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: Crawford v. Washington, a Reassess-
ment of the Confrontation Clause, 35 U. BALT. L.F. 5, 32 (2004) (explaining the require-
ment of intent to make witness unavailable).
215 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 134 S. Ct. at 2724, 2726 (2011) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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actually proceed to trial.”216  It is true that the number of jury trials
has decreased to such a point that they are vanishing,217 but that fact
hardly justifies procedures that will decrease them even more.  No one
knows with certainty the reason for the vanishing trial, but surely one
can conjecture that a major reason is ever more complicated
processes.218  It is particularly unfortunate when Supreme Court Jus-
tices add to these complexities by referring to the already-small num-
ber of jury trials to justify decisions that will reduce them even further.
Fortunately, a clear majority of the Court declined to adopt this
reasoning.  Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, and Kagan refused to join
this part of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion.219  Four justices dissented,
again in an opinion by Justice Kennedy.  These justices were con-
cerned about the doctrinal aspects of the Ginsburg opinion, but also
they were affected by its consequences for trials.220
Justice Ginsburg also suggested, strangely, that defendants regu-
larly will “[stipulate] to the admission of [the] analysis.”221  The basis
of this dubious conclusion was a statement by a group of law profes-
sors as amici curiae, whose own basis was not given.  On the contrary, in
several years of both prosecuting and defending cases like the Bullcom-
ing trial, I never, ever saw a defendant go to trial and stipulate to the
admissibility of an intoxication test.  In fact, since my jurisdiction
required live witnesses, the need to present these witnesses created a
defensive strategy that had nothing to do with stipulation, but that
surely must have helped create the vanishing trial.  It was common for
defendants to demand a trial setting and plead guilty only after seeing
that the prosecution could bodily present all necessary witnesses.  The
tactic was ethical; the question remains whether a rule that required
this waste of resources was appropriate. The four dissenters’ treatment
of this issue makes more sense than relying on law professors as amici.
As the dissenters put it, “if the defense raises an objection and the
analyst is tied up in another court proceeding [or is otherwise unavail-
216 Id. at 2718.
217 The phrase, “vanishing trial” is by now so familiar that a Westlaw search of law
journals produces 696 citations.  One important, often-cited work is Marc Galanter,
The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State
Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
218 See Stephen B. Burbank, Keeping Our Ambition Under Control: The Limits of Data
and Inference in Searching for the Causes and Consequences of Vanishing Trials in Federal
Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 571, 573 (2004) (speculating as to causes but deny-
ing that data can determine them accurately).
219 Bullcoming, 134 S. Ct. at 2709.
220 See supra notes 157–63 and accompanying text.
221 Bullcoming, 134 S. Ct. at 2718.
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able], the defense gets a windfall.”222  Therefore, “good defense attor-
neys will object in ever-greater numbers” to the absence of an
analyst.”223  Justice Ginsburg’s assertions about defensive stipulations
are harmful nonsense.
If the gain was worth these costs, the calculus would be different,
of course.  But a majority of the Court now believes that the values
secured by the Confrontation Clause would be protected more accu-
rately if the testimonial-nontestimonial approach was replaced by one
that focused on hearsay from perceptual witnesses or on preventing
trial by affidavit.224  Similarly, it would seem that a return to the relia-
bility test of Roberts would result in better protection of confrontation
values.  First, Crawford concedes that that approach produced actual
results largely consistent with these values.225  Second, the Roberts test
would countermand the anomaly by which Crawford would admit
unreliable testimony of a kind that was at issue in Raleigh’s Case.226
VI. THE OVERRULING COALITION FORMS: WILLIAMS V. ILLINOIS
The Court’s most recent confrontation decision shows, in opera-
tion, the coalition that can overrule Crawford—and arguably, this deci-
sion does, in fact, overrule it.  In Williams v. Illinois,227 the state offered
DNA evidence from semen residue left in a rape survivor.  Two expert
witnesses sponsored the evidence: first, Karen Abbinanti, who had
produced the profile from a known sample of defendant Sandy Wil-
liams’s blood, and second, Sandra Lambatos, who testified that a pro-
file of the semen residue received from Cellmark, a well-known DNA
laboratory, matched the known profile from Williams.  The prosecu-
tion also offered evidence showing the chain of custody from Chicago
to Cellmark and back, but there was no witness who explained what
had happened at Cellmark.  Specifically, Lambatos had no personal
knowledge of the steps taken at Cellmark to produce the profile.228
The questioned evidence arose when Lambatos referred to the
Cellmark report as covering the unknown sample and to Cellmark’s
role in producing the results. Williams’s lawyer objected to this evi-
222 Id. at 2728 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
223 Id.
224 See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
225 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 100–04, 191–92 and accompanying text.
227 1332 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
228 Id.
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dence on Confrontation Clause grounds.229  The jury convicted Wil-
liams, and the Illinois courts upheld the conviction.
In a fractured decision, the United States Supreme Court also
upheld Williams’s conviction.  The majority included a plurality,
which expressed itself in an opinion by Justice Alito, in which the
Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Breyer joined.  The fifth Jus-
tice was Justice Thomas, who concurred separately.  Four Justices
dissented.
The plurality reasoned, first, that the testimony did not violate
the Confrontation Clause because it was not hearsay.230  It had been
offered to show the basis of Lambatos’s expert opinion, not as sub-
stantive evidence.  The Federal Rules of Evidence allow an expert to
testify on the basis of information that is not itself admissible, and
some courts allow evidence of the inadmissible basis to be admitted to
show the derivation of the expert’s opinion.  The plurality reasoned
that it should preserve this established tradition.231  But the plurality’s
reasoning went further.  Even if the Cellmark report had been offered
as hearsay, it concluded, it would not have been a violation of the
Confrontation Clause, because the plurality followed an approach
that differed from that of Crawford.232
The plurality started with the assertion that not every kind of testi-
monial evidence implicated the clause.233  Only the kind of evidence
featured in abuses that had led to the adoption of the clause could
trigger it.  And that kind of evidence exhibited two elements.  “The
abuses that the Court has identified as prompting the adoption of the
Confrontation Clause shared the following two characteristics: (a)
they involved out-of-court statements having the primary purpose of
accusing a targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct and
(b) they involved formalized statements such as affidavits, depositions,
prior testimony, or confessions.”234  In this case, the plurality reasoned
that the Cellmark report did not accuse a “targeted individual.”  An
individual working in a DNA laboratory to produce a profile does not
usually target a single individual but produces a profile of an
unknown subject, and indeed, the purpose of the profile may even be
to exonerate a subject, rather than to target him.235
229 Id. at 2231.
230 Id. at 2239–40.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 2242.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 2243–44.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL103.txt unknown Seq: 38  8-NOV-12 12:21
152 notre dame law review [vol. 88:1
Justice Thomas made the rest of the five-member majority by fol-
lowing the approach he had developed in the other cases following
Crawford.236  First, contrary to the reasoning of the majority, he con-
cluded that the evidence was hearsay, offered for its truth.237  But
according to Justice Thomas, it was not the kind of evidence that trig-
gered the Confrontation Clause.  The abuses that led to the adoption
of the clause involved formal testimony substitutes such as affidavits or
depositions.  And therefore, he wrote, “I reach this conclusion [that
the clause does not apply] . . . solely because Cellmark’s statements
lacked the requisite ‘formality and solemnity’ to be considered ‘“testi-
monial’” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.”238
From this combination of opinions, one can hazard the guess
(and it is a guess, given the zigs and zags of post-Crawford jurispru-
dence) that the Confrontation Clause will exclude hearsay evidence
only if it “involve[s] formalized statements such as affidavits, deposi-
tions, former testimony, or confessions,” as the plurality put it, or if it
exhibits the requisite “formality and solemnity” to be considered testi-
monial for confrontation purposes, in Justice Thomas’s turn of
phrase.239  The plurality would also, apparently, allow even formal
statements if they did not accuse a targeted individual, and if a fifth
Justice could be found to accept this approach, it too could avoid
exclusion.  To contribute to the uncertainty, however, one might add
that Justice Breyer, although he concurred in the plurality opinion,
wrote a separate concurrence emphasizing the unreasonableness of
insisting on testimony from every participant in the production of
DNA results.240  Justice Breyer’s complex diagram of the process and
its many essential individuals has to be viewed to be believed,241 and
perhaps it shows that Justice Breyer would hesitate to exempt a partic-
ular item of hearsay from the confrontation requirement in a case in
which producing live testimony is more reasonable.
Justice Kagan wrote a dissent in which Justices Scalia, Ginsburg,
and Sotomayor joined.242  As Justice Kagan saw it, this was a clear case
in which the Court should not have hesitated to find a Confrontation
Clause violation:
Under our Confrontation Clause precedents, this is an open-and-
shut case.  The State of Illinois prosecuted Sandy Williams for rape
236 Id. at 2255–56 (Thomas, J., concurring).
237 Id. at 2257.
238 Id. at 2255.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 2244–45 (Breyer, J., concurring).
241 Id. at 2252–54.
242 Id. at 2264 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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based in part on a DNA profile created in Cellmark’s laboratory.
Yet the State did not give Williams a chance to question the analyst
who produced that evidence.  Instead, the prosecution introduced
the results of Cellmark’s testing through an expert witness who had
no idea how they were generated. That approach . . . deprived Wil-
liams of his Sixth Amendment right to “confron[t] . . . the witnesses
against him.”243
One of the flaws in the decision, according to the dissenters, was
the absence of a single coherent theory to support it.  The Court, the
dissenters pointed out, “cannot settle on a reason why” the evidence
did not violate the Confrontation Clause:
Justice Alito, joined by three other Justices, advances two theories—
that the expert’s summary of the Cellmark report was not offered
for its truth, and that the report is not the kind of statement trigger-
ing the Confrontation Clause’s protection. . . . I call Justice Alito’s
opinion “the plurality,” because that is the conventional term for it.
But in all except its disposition, his opinion is a dissent: Five Justices
specifically reject every aspect of its reasoning and every paragraph
of its explication.244
The dissent exhibits several different kinds of flaws.  First, the
Confrontation Clause does not guarantee that the prosecution will
produce witnesses to explain “how [its evidence was] generated.”245  It
applies to “witnesses” against the accused.  The prosecution’s produc-
tion of some witnesses and nonproduction of others is a common
event, and in fact it occurs in nearly every case because at some point
there has to be an end to testimony.  Perhaps a failure by the prosecu-
tion adequately to explain its theories of the evidence could become a
violation of the Due Process Clause at some point, but calling it a vio-
lation of the right to “confront the witnesses” against the defendant
seems doubtful.
Second, as the plurality pointed out, the defense could test the
match with the Cellmark profile by cross-examining Lambatos, and it
was extraordinarily unlikely that the wrong match could have been
produced by either malice or mistake.246  Especially in light of the
large number of potential witnesses in a typical DNA case, it seems
unreasonable to require the prosecution to produce every person that
243 Id. at 2265.
244 Id.
245 The plurality made this point in concluding that the question presented was
whether the Sixth Amendment had been violated, “not whether the State offered suf-
ficient foundational evidence to support the admission of Lambatos’s opinion about
the DNA match.” Id. at 2238 (Alito, J., plurality opinion).
246 Id. at 2239.
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could have had a role in influencing the result.  Third, the concept
that Lambatos’s reference to Cellmark was not hearsay is far more
defensible than the dissent recognized.  The ability of one declarant
to give a description that, by separate and independent evidence,
matches the evidence of another declarant who testifies in a way that
defies coincidence has arisen in some cases that have reasoned that
this evidence, even if it is the repetition of a statement from a nontes-
tifying declarant, is not hearsay.247
But the dissenters’ criticism of the Court’s decision on the
ground that it lacks a single basis is the most remarkable aspect of
their reasoning.  In the first place, some of the dissenters themselves
joined prior decisions following Crawford that also were made up of
pluralities with separate concurrences.248  It is not unusual today to
find this kind of fracturing in the Supreme Court, even if it may be
unfortunate.  In the second place, the fracturing is an indication of
the unworkability of the Crawford reasoning, especially in light of the
fudging and inconsistency in the decisions that preceded it.  It hardly
advances the argument of the dissent to demonstrate, once again, how
Crawford splits the Court.  In the third place, the dissenters’ assertion
that five justices “specifically reject every aspect of [the plurality’s] rea-
soning” is flatly incorrect.249
A single theory that replaces Crawford does appear to be shared
by five justices, even though it is expressed in opinions that disagree in
other respects.  Justice Thomas and the plurality made up a majority
that, in fact, agreed upon the single most basic feature of both opin-
ions: an insistence that exclusion under the Confrontation Clause
extends only to “formalized” or “solemn[ ]” out-of-court declarations
that are generated by the state as evidence.250  In fact, one can argue
that the Court now has overruled Crawford’s wholesale exclusion of
testimonial evidence—in Williams, sub silentio, by a majority that
excludes only the narrower category of manufactured statements.  An
247 See, e.g., Bridges v. State, 19 N.W.2d 529 (Wis. 1945).  In that case, police
officers testified to statements by a child who was molested, describing the room to
which the defendant had abducted her.  Independent evidence established a match
between the child’s descriptions and a room where the defendant lived.  The court
recognized that the repetition of the statements would have been hearsay if the pur-
pose had been to establish the characteristics of the room, but held that it was not
hearsay because of the fact that the child’s description matched the independently
proved reality.  The reasoning in Bridges parallels a line of analysis that is equally
applicable in Williams.  The plurality, in fact, used similar reasoning. Williams, 132 S.
Ct. at 2221.
248 See supra Part IV.
249 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2265.
250 See supra notes 235–38 and accompanying text.
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explicit opinion discarding the old regime would be preferable, but
perhaps the reality that Crawford has been overruled already exists.
CONCLUSION: CONSIDERING THE OVERRULING OF CRAWFORD UNDER
THE PAYNE-PARENTHOOD FACTORS
The Payne-Parenthood factors support the overruling of Craw-
ford.251  First, although this kind of conclusion is always debatable,
there is ample ground for asserting that Crawford is wrongly reasoned.
Justice Scalia’s pivotal claim that there is only one historical hearsay
exception contrary to his new testimony-based theory, dying declara-
tions, is simply erroneous. The clear example of confessions either did
not occur to him or was excluded from consideration for some odd
reason, and the examples of public records, business records, and
recorded recollection memorializing litigation-related facts also con-
tradict his assertion.252  The anti-reliability history recited in Crawford
is so selective that it can justifiably be labeled revisionist, beginning
with the example of the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, who objected to
parts of the evidence on reliability grounds of precisely the kind that
Justice Scalia pronounced irrelevant to history (a passage that Justice
Scalia omitted from his opinion).253  The centuries-old approach of
admitting hearsay under exceptions based on reliability and necessity
implies the weakness of Crawford’s treatment of reliability as irrele-
vant, since the history of the hearsay rule and the Confrontation
Clause are intertwined, even if they are not identical.  Furthermore,
the repeated judicial fudging that has been necessary for post-Craw-
ford results to avoid nonsense is indicative that the decision is unwork-
able, and so is the consensus of commentators.254  Finally, by
departing from stare decisis without analyzing whether the departure
could be justified under the Court’s decisions authorizing it,255 Justice
Scalia arguably engaged in reasoning that ought itself to be rejected.
Second, as a constitutional decision, and one dealing with proce-
dure or evidence, Crawford qualifies more readily for overruling.
Third, reliance interests would be disturbed less in the overruling of
Crawford than most changes of law because the alternative interpretive
theories that the Court might adopt would exclude less of the reliable
evidence that would likely be preserved.  The application of theories
251 This Conclusion relies generally on the criteria from Payne and Parenthood that
are documented supra in Part II.A of this Article.
252 See supra Part III.A.
253 See supra notes 100–04, 191–92 and accompanying text.
254 See supra Part IV.
255 See supra Part II.
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such as that of Justice Thomas or of the dissenters in Melendez-Diaz,
focused on the true purposes of the Confrontation Clause, would
interfere less with reliance interests because they would exclude less
evidence that all jurisdictions have set up systems to collect,256 and a
return to reliability would focus on evidence that evidence-gatherers
would expect they should have preserved, that is, reliable evidence.
Fourth, Crawford has produced a number of “spirited dissents.”257
And as for “narrow margins” of decision, although Crawford itself pro-
duced only two dissenting justices, the later cases have featured not
merely a narrow margin of decision, but an actual majority that would
reject the Crawford approach.258  Fifth, the later decisions have pro-
duced outcomes not merely in the lower courts, but in the Supreme
Court itself, that are so inconsistent that Justice Scalia has charged
that they “demean” the Court.259
Consideration of the later factors added by Planned Parenthood
supports the same result.  Seventh, comparison of other decisions that
have overruled precedent to Crawford does not show a lesser justifica-
tion for overruling this decision.  There was no greater inconsistency
in the decisions preceding Payne, nor was the decision any more
unworkable.  Eighth, although “evolution of legal principles” render-
ing a prior decision an “anachronism” is not an easy factor to apply to
this controversy, the judicial fudging that was necessary in later deci-
sions shows that the Crawford approach is difficult to reconcile with
principles that the Court later generated.260  Ninth, although it is simi-
larly difficult to consider whether changes in “factual underpinnings”
have weakened Crawford, the application of that decision to later-aris-
ing technological issues has produced still more judicial fudging.261
Tenth and finally, assuming this factor is legitimate (as it arguably is
not), overruling Crawford would not create political fallout that would
harm the judiciary.  Judging from the reactions of commentators, who
use labels ranging from “unstable” to “unspeakable,” overruling Craw-
ford would more likely earn respect for the courts.262
The Crawford approach has created enough confusion.  It has
required enough judicial fudging.  It has elicited enough demonstra-
tions that it is the wrong interpretation of the Constitution.  It has
256 See supra notes 157–163 and accompanying text.
257 See supra Part IV.B (describing the Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming dissents, as
well as concurrences).
258 See supra Part IV.B.
259 See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text.
260 See supra Part IV.
261 See supra Part IV.B.
262 See supra Part IV.C.
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produced enough strange and harmful results.  The time has come
for the Court to consign Crawford to the burial it merits.  It can be
argued that, in the Williams decision, the Court has overruled Craw-
ford by implication, but an explicit rejection would be better.
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